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NO. 16 APRIL 2020 Introduction 
The Refugee Drama in Syria, Turkey, 
and Greece 
Why a Comprehensive Approach Is Needed 
Sinem Adar, Steffen Angenendt, Muriel Asseburg, Raphael Bossong, and David Kipp 
The plight of refugees in the Syrian province of Idlib, on the Greek islands, and on 
the EU’s external borders has worsened dramatically over the last few months. Once 
more, the European Union (EU) is split on questions of asylum and migration, and it 
portrays limited capacity to act in issues of foreign and security policy. What options 
does the EU have to address the deteriorating situation? This question has become 
even more pressing due to the spread of Covid-19. The EU-Turkey statement of 2016 
has strengthened cooperation with Ankara on humanitarian aid and border controls, 
but it also has major weaknesses. A comprehensive approach is needed. The EU 
should prioritise providing new financial resources for Turkey that should be com-
plemented by scaling-up assistance to Greece as well as to Syria’s neighbours. In 
addition, the Europeans should support the creation of a safe zone in northern Idlib. 
 
As in 2015, the worsening of the refugee 
situation in Greece and Turkey today stems 
from an escalation in the (civil) war in Syria. 
Since April 2019, the regime in Damascus 
has launched a number of military offen-
sives aimed at reconquering the province 
of Idlib in the country’s north-west, with 
the overall goal of reclaiming the whole 
of Syria’s territory. An agreement between 
Russia and Turkey (the September 2018 
Sochi Agreement) had previously averted 
the offensive, but it was ultimately unable 
to prevent it. Even the Turkish observation 
posts along the agreed ceasefire line did not 
change this. In December 2019 the Syrian 
regime launched its latest military cam-
paign with the support of its allies – 
Russia, Iran, and Iranian-led militias. 
In order to counter the advances of the 
Syrian army, Ankara increasingly supported 
Syrian rebels and brought its own troops 
and heavy equipment to the frontlines 
starting in February 2020. Turkey wants 
to prevent a renewed rush of refugees to its 
borders, to underpin its demand for a safe 
zone or buffer zone in the border region, 
and to shore up its negotiating position 
with regard to three areas on Syrian terri-
tory that it currently occupies. After a dra-
matic escalation between Turkey and Syr-
ian rebels on the one hand, and the Syrian 
army, Russia, Iran, and Iranian-led militias 
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on the other, Moscow and Ankara agreed 
upon another ceasefire on 5 March 2020. 
The ceasefire applies to a narrow six-kilo-
metre strip on both sides of the M4 motor-
way connecting the Syrian provincial capi-
tals Latakia and Aleppo. Even if the cease-
fire has since resulted in a cessation of air 
strikes, the arrangement is not intended to 
be permanent and does not settle the con-
flicting interests of the actors involved. Its 
implementation has also proven to be 
difficult. 
Dramatic Situation of 
Internally Displaced Persons 
in Northern Syria 
Against this background, the predicament 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
Syria has further worsened. According to 
the United Nations (UN), from the begin-
ning of December 2019 to mid-March 2020, 
almost one million Syrians – approximately 
60 per cent of which are children and 20 
per cent women – fled from the fighting 
and the advancing Syrian Arab Army. 
Today, around a quarter of the people in 
the affected areas of the provinces of Idlib 
and Aleppo are on the run. The way to 
Turkey, however, is blocked – all border 
crossings into Turkey have, in principle, 
been kept closed since March 2015. Turkey 
also completed a border wall in 2018 and 
has used force to repel new refugees from 
Syria, as reported by human rights organi-
sations. Some 550,000 Syrians have thus 
sought refuge in the border region in north-
western Idlib, and more than 400,000 have 
moved to Turkish-controlled areas further 
east, mainly in the enclaves of al-Bab and 
Afrin. 
For many, it is not their first displace-
ment. Since 2017, some 1.5 million Syrians 
have been evacuated to Idlib from other 
parts of the country in the course of so-
called reconciliation agreements, which 
served the regime in Damascus to recon-
quer breakaway territories, or have fled 
there. This has doubled the population 
in the province of Idlib. Even before the 
current crisis, 2.8 million people in north-
west Syria were dependent on humanitarian 
aid. Harsh weather conditions have added 
to the worsening situation of refugees: 
There is a lack of (heated) shelters, water, 
sanitary facilities, food, and protection 
against attacks. 
Further forced displacement from Syria 
towards Turkey is foreseeable once the 
fighting in the province of Idlib intensifies 
again or if Damascus takes control of the 
north-west of the country. Yet, Turkey is 
not ready to accept more refugees and is 
therefore likely to keep the border closed. 
Even in the mid to long term, Syrian refu-
gees are unlikely to return to Syria in 
significant numbers. Rather, more Syrians 
are likely to leave, or want to leave, the 
country in order to escape repression and 
persecution or – in view of the economic 
and currency crisis – to make a living else-
where. 
Situation of Refugees in Turkey 
Turkey hosts the largest refugee population 
worldwide. Syrians, with around 3.6 mil-
lion people, constitute the largest group. In 
addition, there are 400,000 to 500,000 non-
Syrian refugees, mainly from Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Iran. Syrian refugees enjoy tem-
porary protection in Turkey, and only about 
2 per cent of them live in refugee camps. 
They can obtain work permits, but this 
ultimately depends on the goodwill of their 
employers. Compared with neighbouring 
countries, refugees in Turkey have a high 
rate of school enrolment and a large pro-
portion work in the (mainly) informal sec-
tor. Nevertheless, it remains a major chal-
lenge for Turkey to integrate Syrian refu-
gees into its society and economy (see SWP 
Comments 1/2020 and 5/2020). Moreover, 
popular attitudes towards refugees have 
become increasingly hostile as the economic 
crisis in the country deepens. As a result, 
the government has ramped up restrictive 
measures. Syrian refugees are no longer 
allowed to stay in Istanbul, but only in the 
districts where they were originally regis-
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tered. It also appears that some refugees 
have been pressured to sign up for “volun-
tary” return. In practice they are threatened 
with deportation in inhumane conditions. 
According to the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approxi-
mately 87,000 refugees returned to Syria 
from Turkey between 2016 and January 
2020. It is fair to assume that a sizeable 
portion of them did not do so voluntarily. 
The repatriation of refugees also plays 
a growing role in Ankara’s military offen-
sives against its southern neighbour. When 
“Operation Olive Branch” began in January 
2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan em-
phasised in a speech that the goal was 
“to return Afrin to its true owners ... and to 
return three and a half million Syrians to 
their homeland”. In September 2019 – one 
month before the latest military invasion – 
Erdoğan presented a plan to the UN General 
Assembly that foresaw reconstruction proj-
ects to settle about one million refugees in 
a safe zone in north-eastern Syria. 
Escalation at the 
Turkish-Greek Border 
At the end of February 2020, the Turkish 
government announced that it would open 
its border to Europe. In doing so, it drew 
refugees and migrants to the crossings with 
Greece, provoking a local humanitarian 
emergency. Four objectives informed An-
kara’s decision: 1) to obtain more EU finan-
cial support for hosting refugees; 2) to com-
mit Europe to providing stronger financial 
and diplomatic support in the face of the 
humanitarian emergency in Idlib, which 
would help to overcome the crisis on the 
ground and prevent new refugee move-
ments into Turkey; 3) to shore up political/ 
military backing for Turkey’s agenda in 
northern Syria; and 4) to receive financial 
support for its reconstruction efforts there, 
including the creation of residential devel-
opment projects for repatriated refugees. 
The Greek government used tear gas 
and rubber bullets to prevent refugees and 
migrants from entering Greece, and it 
suspended the right to apply for asylum 
for one month. According to press reports, 
a secret camp on the Greek mainland has 
been used to detain newly arrived migrants 
and refugees in order to return them directly 
to Turkey, bypassing the rule of law. Numer-
ous EU representatives, including Commis-
sion President Ursula von der Leyen and 
the Council of Interior Ministers, expressed 
clear support for Greece in these endeav-
ours. Frontex, the EU’s border and coast 
guard, was tasked with launching two rapid 
interventions to reinforce Greek land and 
sea borders with Turkey and to intensify 
repatriation operations. For these and other 
measures – such as offering financial in-
centive programmes for voluntary returns, 
increasing reception capacities in the Evros 
region of Greece, and strengthening locally-
needed infrastructure for health and safety 
screening – the EU Commission provided 
€350 million in emergency aid. It announced 
that this amount would be doubled through 
a reallocation of budgetary resources. Only 
after some delay did the EU Commissioner 
for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, voice 
cautious criticisms of Greece’s clear viola-
tions of international and European refugee 
law. Therefore, with the growing opera-
tional involvement of EU agencies in north-
ern Greece, there is a risk of sharing respon-
sibility for the violations of human rights 
and refugee law. 
By mid-March the immediate crisis at the 
EU’s external border in Greece had eased. 
Since then, Turkey has transported several 
thousand irregular migrants and refugees 
that remained in the Evros border region 
back to Turkish cities. What has often been 
described from a European perspective as 
attempted blackmail by Ankara appears 
to have come to an end for the time being. 
The Turkish coast guard has also resumed 
its regular border surveillance. However, 
this is unlikely to stop crossings to the 
Greek Aegean islands completely, especially 
when milder weather conditions return in 
the spring. 
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Perpetual Crisis on the 
Greek Islands 
Living conditions for migrants and refugees 
on the Greek islands remain catastrophic. 
The facilities (so-called hotspots), which 
were set up with EU support starting at the 
end of 2015, were meant to accommodate 
just over 6,000 people, but they currently 
house more than 41,000 people. The over-
crowding is an – unplanned – conse-
quence of the EU-Turkey statement of 2016, 
which stipulates, among other things, that 
asylum seekers may not, as a rule, be trans-
ferred to mainland Greece. At the same 
time, asylum procedures on the islands 
have been extremely slow, and repatriations 
to Turkey that were originally intended have 
hardly been implemented. Non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), UNHCR, and 
various EU institutions have long criticised 
the living conditions in the hotspots. In 
addition to overcrowding, a lack of security, 
dismal sanitary conditions, and insufficient 
access to medical care and psycho-social 
support add to the humanitarian crisis. 
Accidents and fires occur repeatedly, as do 
violent riots, which have already claimed 
several lives. The first Covid-19 infections 
among migrants and refugees in a reception 
centre on the Greek mainland illustrate the 
even more serious threat to the health and 
lives of those detained in camps on the 
islands. 
For months already, the Greek govern-
ment has been considering the evacuation 
of refugees to the mainland. In the medium 
to long term, Athens wants to house new 
asylum seekers arriving on the islands in 
closed facilities. However, local protests 
have so far largely prevented their construc-
tion. With the asylum law that came into 
force in January 2020, Greece has further 
restricted the rights that allow asylum 
seekers to stay in the country; the use of the 
police and the military is intended to speed 
up the asylum procedures. Whether the 
Greek government will succeed in return-
ing rejected asylum seekers to Turkey in 
larger numbers than in the past depends on 
two questionable assumptions. On the one 
hand, Greek courts would have to consider 
Turkey as a safe third country. Related legal 
challenges have already been raised against 
summary deportations of irregular migrants 
during the current crisis. One the other 
hand, Ankara would need to offer construc-
tive cooperation, which has been funda-
mentally called into question by the recent 
crisis at the common land border. 
Background of the 
EU-Turkey Statement 
Cooperation between the EU and Turkey is 
urgently needed, both for refugee protec-
tion and for border security. Over the past 
weeks, both sides have emphasised that 
the existing EU-Turkey statement of March 
2016 – often referred to as the refugee 
or migration “pact” or “deal” – continues 
to serve as a common point of reference. 
Following a meeting with Erdoğan in Brus-
sels on 9 March 2020, EU Council President 
Charles Michel announced that EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy Josep Borrell and Turkish Foreign 
Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu should jointly 
review how the 2016 statement could be 
better put into practice. 
By 2014 the escalation of the civil war in 
Syria had led to a massive regional crisis of 
forced displacement, all while the UNHCR 
was facing severe shortages of humanitarian 
aid. Brussels’ first response was to launch 
the “EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to 
the Syrian Crisis” (“Madad Fund”). The trust 
fund provided initial financial support for 
several of Syria’s neighbouring countries in 
2014, but it was far from sufficient. In view 
of rapidly rising refugee numbers, Brussels 
pursued more comprehensive stabilisation 
measures in autumn 2015 with the “EU-
Turkey Joint Action Plan”. The first part of 
the plan aimed at improving the humani-
tarian situation of refugees in Turkey. This 
was to be achieved both through European 
financial aid and through legal and institu-
tional reforms in Turkey. The latter were 
particularly decisive for providing Syrians 
with medium-term prospects. For example, 
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the Turkish labour market was opened 
up and Syrian children were able to go to 
school. The second part of the Action Plan 
focussed on border management and infor-
mation campaigns against irregular migra-
tion. This was in the interest of Europe as 
well as Turkey. After all, Turkey wanted 
to avoid serving as a corridor for irregular 
migration from various parts of the Middle 
East and Asia to Europe over the long term. 
However, a broader political agreement 
became necessary in order to get the co-
operation between Europe and Turkey off 
the ground and operational. This was done 
in March 2016 with the EU-Turkey state-
ment, in which the Europeans committed 
to mobilise up to €6 billion until the end 
of 2018. In return, no more asylum appli-
cations were to be accepted from Syrians 
who landed irregularly on the Greek 
islands. Instead, they were to be returned 
to Turkey as swiftly as possible – which 
would be defined as a safe third country 
for this purpose. Conversely, the EU would 
accept vulnerable persons from Turkey 
through resettlement, ideally in corre-
sponding numbers to the Syrians returned 
from the Greek islands (“one-to-one mecha-
nism”). In the case that irregular crossings 
over the Aegean were by-and-large stopped, 
Europe offered the prospect of further re-
settlements from Turkey. The EU also com-
mitted to revitalising accession talks with 
Ankara to continue work on deepening 
the customs union and accelerating nego-
tiations on visa liberalisation for Turkish 
citizens. 
Implementation of the Statement 
To date, most of the pledged €6 billion in 
European financial support has been spent 
on education, health, and humanitarian 
aid. According to the EU Commission, con-
tracts for services worth €4.7 billion have 
been signed, of which €3.2 billion has 
already been paid out. Financial resources 
have been approved, mainly for projects 
implemented by UN agencies, international 
financial organisations, and some NGOs. A 
good €1.5 billion has also been earmarked 
directly for state agencies in Turkey, above 
all the Ministry of Education. In an audit at 
the end of 2018, the EU Court of Auditors 
emphasised the need to shift from short-
term, limited humanitarian aid to the crea-
tion of sustainable support structures for 
refugees. 
From a European perspective, the great-
est achievement of the EU-Turkey statement 
is that the number of irregular border cross-
ings into the EU has been greatly reduced. 
For many proponents of the pact, the most 
important argument for its continuation is 
the deterrent effect on sea crossings and the 
subsequently lower number of drownings. 
The one-to-one mechanism has often been 
described as the reason for this develop-
ment, as Syrians received the political sig-
nal that they would be deported from Greek 
islands back to Turkey. However, in prac-
tice, the implementation of this aspect of 
the EU-Turkey statement has been very 
limited. By the end of January 2020, only 
about 2,000 people had been transferred 
from Greece to Turkey since 2016 – a frac-
tion of the overall number of asylum seek-
ers on the Greek islands over the same 
period. The largest group of returnees was 
comprised of Pakistanis, who have no pros-
pect of protection, either in the EU or in 
Turkey. At the same time, the EU received 
more than 25,000 Syrians from Turkey 
who were particularly in need of protec-
tion. Despite the larger number of people, 
this was less than half of the quota origi-
nally planned. In light of this, one can 
question whether the one-to-one mecha-
nism of the EU-Turkey statement made 
a significant and lasting impact on the 
number of irregular landings on the Greek 
islands. Weather conditions, the improved 
humanitarian situation in Turkey, and 
increased border controls on the so-called 
Western Balkan route could also be respon-
sible for the rapid and steep reduction in 
sea crossings, which was already apparent 
in the winter of 2015/2016. More recently, 
the inhumane reception and living con-
ditions on the Greek islands acted as a 
standalone deterrent factor. 
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Other elements of the EU-Turkey state-
ment, such as accelerated visa liberalisa-
tion, could not – and cannot – be im-
plemented due to the domestic political 
situation in Turkey since the attempted 
coup of July 2016. Only the deepening of 
the customs union still seems feasible from 
a technical point of view. However, eco-
nomic conditions have changed consider-
ably in the meantime, adding to general 
problems with regard to the rule of law 
in Turkey. 
Of the nine points contained in the state-
ment, only the European pledge of finan-
cial aid was ultimately kept – though with 
considerable delays. The EU can point out 
that the vast majority of the financial re-
sources have been allocated, and funds that 
have not yet been disbursed will eventually 
all be paid out in the context of longer-term 
projects. Nevertheless, Turkey can legiti-
mately call for more resources and speedy 
disbursements to avoid shortfalls, as the 
first projects providing direct support for 
Syrian families will come to an end in 
autumn 2020. The EU has not yet been 
able to agree internally on new funds for 
Turkey, not least because the negotiations 
on the next EU multiannual financial frame-
work (2021–2027) have proven to be very 
difficult so far. The Corona crisis is likely 
to exacerbate the situation and push inter-
national humanitarian aid to the back-
burner, as EU member states are now ur-
gently adopting comprehensive emergency 
and supplementary budgets to contain the 
economic damage at home. 
Reform Proposals for the 
EU-Turkey Statement 
The starting point for any reform is to 
evaluate the deficits of the existing frame-
work for cooperation under the EU-Turkey 
statement. The criticisms range from the 
lack of monitoring mechanisms, the miser-
able reception conditions on the Greek 
islands, the insufficient quality and exces-
sively long duration of asylum procedures 
in Greece, to insufficient numbers of repat-
riations to Turkey as well as of refugees 
who are directly resettled from Turkey by 
EU member states. In conclusion, the pact 
as a whole is not working. 
Based on this assessment, one may rec-
ommend smaller or fundamental reforms 
to the cooperation format with Turkey over 
migration control and border security. Very 
far-reaching proposals are coming from the 
European Stability Initiative (ESI), which sees 
itself as the initiator of the EU-Turkey state-
ment. The ESI advocates a structural over-
haul and renewal, an “EU-Turkey statement 
2.0” with short- and medium-term measures. 
The most urgent task would be to end the 
humanitarian emergency on the Greek 
islands by immediately emptying the camps 
while also preventing a new humanitarian 
catastrophe on the Greek mainland. 
To achieve such a transformation of the 
current status quo, Greek authorities would 
have to prioritise two measures. First, new 
and sufficient reception centres and shelters 
would have to replace the existing camps, 
which need to be closed. Second, the Greek 
asylum system should undergo deep reform 
to enable asylum procedures to be com-
pleted within two months, including the 
appealing of any decisions. Greece would 
need the support of other EU countries in 
planning and implementing such a system. 
According to the proposals of the ESI, newly 
arrived Syrians to Greece would be sent 
back to Turkey without an individual asy-
lum procedure. This would have to be 
accompanied by a review mechanism with 
Ankara to ensure that they are treated in 
Turkey in accordance with international 
standards. It is argued that a “statement 
2.0” could stabilise the situation in the 
Aegean and reduce the number of irregular 
entries into Greece. In return, the EU states 
should keep their promise to resettle more 
refugees directly from Turkey. This would 
have to be on a larger scale than in the 
past, for example 50,000 people within the 
first year. Moreover, an additional €6 bil-
lion should be provided to Turkey for its 
continuing efforts to host and integrate 
Syrian refugees, whose numbers are likely 
to rise further over the coming years. 
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Some of these reform proposals are in-
deed essential. Especially in light of the 
Covid-19 crisis, it has become truly urgent 
to empty the camps on the islands. It would 
also be beneficial to support Greece in pro-
cessing asylum applications, to undertake 
more resettlements from mainland Greece 
to other EU states, and to make further 
financial contributions to Turkey. Yet, it 
makes little sense to continue the one-to-
one mechanism of repatriation and resettle-
ment. Even if the ESI acknowledges prob-
lems with this provision of the EU-Turkey 
statement, its reform proposal still assumes 
that any irregular migrant who arrives in 
Greece after the entry into force of a new 
edition of the statement could be returned 
to Turkey. However, experience to date 
shows that the preconditions for consider-
ably increasing the number of returns 
to Turkey are too high. This component 
should therefore be dispensed within any 
future cooperation framework between 
the EU and Turkey. 
A Comprehensive Approach 
It is clearly not sufficient to only reform the 
EU-Turkey statement. Rather, Europe needs 
to pursue a more comprehensive approach 
to deal with the challenges. First and fore-
most, the EU must support Greece more 
decisively. The perpetual state of emergency 
on the islands should be ended as soon as 
possible by means of evacuations to the 
mainland. Greece has currently more than 
90,000 open asylum procedures. These 
cases cannot be processed adequately with-
out more substantial EU assistance. Earlier 
this year, the European Asylum Support 
Office announced that it intends to double 
the number of officials seconded to Greece 
to more than 1,000 this year. This promise 
needs to be fulfilled, despite the unexpected 
constraints of the Corona crisis. In parallel, 
programmes for resettlement to other mem-
ber states are urgently needed for recog-
nised refugees. This should build on the 
first voluntary initiative by seven EU mem-
ber states to accept 1,600 unaccompanied 
minors, which still has to be put into prac-
tice. Public health risks will be even less 
manageable if the situation in the camps 
remains unaddressed. For rejected asylum 
seekers, EU-funded programmes for volun-
tary return are conceivable, as far as the 
situation in the country of origin permits it. 
Effective support for Greece will also be a 
precondition for the fundamental reform 
of the Common European Asylum System, 
which will be proposed by the EU Commis-
sion in the “Pact on Migration and Asylum” 
later this spring. This structural endeavour 
is more important than ever. The increas-
ingly widespread suspension of the right to 
asylum and the full closure of international 
borders during the Corona crisis must not 
be accepted as the new normal. 
Second, it is in Europe’s interest to be-
come more involved in Syria’s neighbour-
ing states. The material and social costs that 
the main host countries for Syrian refugees 
(Turkey: 3.6 million; Lebanon: 900,000; 
Jordan: 650,000; Iraq: 250,000) have accrued 
need to be compensated more systematically. 
Europe thus should prevent premature 
returns from these countries to Syria, which 
remains highly insecure. Early returns 
would also completely overload the aid 
organisations working in Syria. Instead, 
Europeans should invest much more deci-
sively than they have so far in the human 
capital of the Syrian population within the 
diaspora. According to the United Nations 
Children’s Fund, about half of all Syrian 
children in the country itself as well as in 
neighbouring countries currently do not 
attend school. Regardless of whether refu-
gees return to Syria or remain permanently 
in the respective host countries, adequate 
education, training, and services are essen-
tial to ensure that they do not remain de-
pendent on aid in the long term. With this 
priority in mind, the EU should also deepen 
its dialogue with host countries. 
Third, it is in Europe’s interest to make a 
rapid and substantial contribution towards 
alleviating the plight of refugees in the 
embattled Idlib province and preventing 
Covid-19 from spreading among the IDP 
population. That is why the Europeans – 
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in cooperation with UNHCR, the World 
Health Organisation, the World Food Pro-
gramme, international NGOs, and Tur-
key – should immediately provide aid and 
emergency shelter for those who are forced 
to camp in inhuman conditions near the 
Turkish border. At the same time, Russia 
must be pressured to ensure that cross-
border access for humanitarian aid is main-
tained after 10 July 2020, when the respec-
tive Security Council resolution expires. 
Europeans should also exert efforts vis-à-vis 
Moscow and Ankara to extend and con-
solidate the ceasefire in Idlib so that a 
political compromise can be negotiated for 
various points of contention (territorial 
control, protection for the civilian popu-
lation, dealing with armed fighters, etc.). 
Fourth, in this context, it would make 
sense if Russia and Turkey committed to 
creating and securing a safe zone for IDPs 
in the north of Idlib province. Europeans 
should offer support for the establishment 
of such a zone, provided that certain mini-
mum conditions are guaranteed, for exam-
ple: the zone should be reserved for unarmed 
civilians only; it should not become a base 
for military operations; nor should it be 
used for the repatriation of refugees from 
Turkey. Military engagement by Europeans 
or even NATO, as demanded by Ankara, 
would be rejected by Moscow (as well as 
Damascus) and would not receive a UN 
Security Council mandate. It would there-
fore run the risk of further escalating the 
situation instead of helping to stabilise it. 
Nor should the Europeans provide diplo-
matic, financial, or military support for 
Turkey’s military operations and political 
ambitions in northern Syria. Although 
Turkey has a legitimate interest in securing 
its border with Syria and fending off poten-
tial attacks on its territory, its military 
invasions and occupation of Syrian territory 
are in clear breach of international law. 
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